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PROPER FUNCTION, EMOTION, AND 
VIRTUES OF THE INTELLECT 
Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood 
Alvin Plantinga's proper function epistemology is an incipient 
virtues epistemology of a sort that we call personal virtues epis-
temology. Personal virtues are bases of proper functioning of 
persons, rather than of faculties or of persons as occupying par-
ticular roles such as hockey player or medical pathologist; and 
personal epistemic virtues are such personal virtues as promote 
the acquisition, maintenance, transmission, and application of 
knowledge. As such, many bases of proper functioning relevant 
to warrant of true beliefs are perfections of the will. We particu-
larly stress emotional functioning, and see in Plantinga's discus-
sion of the Aquinas I Calvin model for the warrant of theism, 
and the extended A I C model for warranted Christian belief, 
and especially in his exploitation of Jonathan Edwards, move-
ment in the direction of a personal virtues epistemology. This 
paper is an effort to hasten the movement. 
Introduction 
Alvin Plantinga's proper function theory of warrant is one of the most 
viable and complete contemporary accounts of knowledge. On his view, 
knowledge is true belief that achieves a certain threshold amount of war-
rant, and a belief is warranted if and only if it is the product of cognitive 
faculties functioning properly in a congenial environment according to a 
design plan successfully aimed at truth and is held with a certain threshold 
degree of conviction.! Though Plantinga has been coy about associating 
with virtue epistemology, we think this a natural direction to take his 
views, and we here sketch and commend an extension of his work into a 
certain kind of virtue epistemology. A main aim of Plantinga's epistemolo-
gy is to produce a definition of knowledge in terms of its strictly necessary 
and sufficient conditions. In our extension of Plantinga's views, that aspi-
ration is much less central and we remain agnostic about its feasibility. We 
think that in the absence of such a definition much can still be profitably 
learned about knowledge. 
The notion of proper function is strongly reminiscent of Aristotelian 
thinking about the virtues, since for Aristotle virtues are enduring, learned 
traits or qualities of persons whereby persons function well as persons, in 
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the various aspects of human existence. The conception of virtues that we 
employ in this paper stresses the qualifier as a person and interprets it as 
implying a contrast with qualifiers like as a scientist, as a lawyer, and as a bas-
ketball player; we also imply an integration of the parts or aspects of the per-
son, such that excellences that are merely excellences of parts - say, of the 
eyes or the legs - are not what we call virtues, even though they are excel-
lences and may be epistemic excellences. On the view of virtues that we 
propose it is natural to think of proper epistemic functioning as depending 
not just on the proper functioning of the specifically cognitive faculties, but 
on traits that make for the broader proper functioning of the person. This 
integrative view seems to imply that virtues are acquired traits, in particu-
lar, products of a felicitous moral and epistemic education. Thus the epis-
ternic virtues that interest us are such personal traits as a passion for know-
ing, openness to correction, objectivity, proper tenacity of belief, self-criti-
calness, intellectual honesty, perseverance in intellectual work, intellectual 
humility, intellectual daring, intellectual caution, and intellectual generosi-
ty. We shall argue that a virtue epistemology focusing on this kind of 
virhles is a natural extension of Plantinga's proper function epistemology. 
Another feature of the Aristotelian conception of the moral virtues 
(though interestingly not of the intellectual ones, except for practical wis-
dom) is their connection with the passions. Aristotle analyzes many of the 
moral virtues as dispositions to respond to situations with proper pathe. 
In the third and final book of Plantinga's series on warrant," with consider-
able leading from the Christian tradition, he begins to develop a concep-
tion of a positive epistemic role for the emotions. He does this in dialog 
with Jonathan Edwards, in an effort to show that a person can be warrant-
ed in holding the distinctive Christian beliefs - belief in the incarnation of 
God in Christ and Christ's atoning death. The richness of his epistemology 
and its potential for the kind of extension we propose is due in large part to 
its religious motivation and the character of the particular religious tradi-
tion to which Plantinga belongs. But we think that the dependency of 
proper epistemic function on emotions is quite general and not limited to 
the context of religious belief. 
So our proposed extension of Plantinga's views has two aspects. On the 
one side, we think that proper epistemic functioning is not limited to the 
functioning of the faculties, but is more broadly the proper functioning of 
the epistemic agent as a person, so that traits of the person and not merely 
traits of the faculties are the basis for warrant in many important cases. 
And on the other side, we want to say that these intellectual virtues, as 
traits of persons, are intimately connected in a variety of ways with proper 
emotional functioning. We assume that, just as the proper functioning of 
parts of things depends on the condition those parts are in (the proper 
functioning of the eye depends on its being in a physical condition that 
experts would consider a state of health of the eye), so the proper function-
ing of persons, in epistemic contexts as well as others, depends on the per-
sons' being in certain conditions that we call virtues. We are especially 
interested in Plantinga's recent interest in the emotions, since we think that 
pretty much the whole range of virtues, both intellectual and moral, are in 
part dispositions with respect to emotions.3 Speaking a little loosely for 
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summary's sake, we might say that the virtues that concern us here involve 
proper orderings of emotions. Such dispositional orderings are the bases 
for the kind of epistemic functioning that interests us. 
In the first section we discuss Plantinga's application of his theory of 
warrant to Christian beliefs, since this will nicely illustrate the need for 
both sides of our extension. The integration of functions of the "intellect" 
and the "will" in producing Christian knowledge is a model for the pro-
duction of much important human knowledge; and the need for the trans-
formative development of these functions into the virtue of faith is a model 
for other bases of proper epistemic function. In the second section we 
make some general comments about the nature of virtues. In the third, we 
argue that epistemic virtues are, in large part, dispositions with respect to 
emotions, and we identify seven respects in which this is so. The fourth 
section is an illustration of our extension, and in the conclusion we com-
ment about the nature of the epistemology we are proposing. 
Warranted Christian Belief 
Christian belief is a special kind of theism; that is, the Christian believes 
there is a personal being who is all powerful, all knowing, and all benevo-
lent, who created the world. This belief can be warranted for her, since 
according to Plantinga's model (which is a souped-up version of John 
Calvin and Thomas Aquinas), humans have a faculty for knowing God 
(the sensus divinitatis, in Calvin's phrase) which, when functioning proper-
ly, gives rise, typically without inference, to the belief that there is such a 
being, in response to a range of rather diverse stimuli, such as perceptions 
of the starry heavens; "the majestic grandeur of the mountains ... ; the 
ancient brooding presence of the Australian outback" (WCB, 174); also to 
moments of realizing one has done something cheap, and moments of 
grave danger. According to the model, God created us with this faculty as 
an access to the truth that he exists, and he made it such that it is triggered 
by situations typical of the kind of environment we find ourselves in. So 
on Plantinga's view of warrant, a person is warranted in believing in God 
in case she holds this belief with a certain degree of conviction, and her 
belief is produced by the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis. 
It seems to us that Plantinga's account of warranted religious belief is 
like a chrysalis just on the point of becoming a lovely butterfly of virtue 
theory. Plantinga recommends a revision of Calvin's claim that God's exis-
tence is a truth "of which each of us is master from his mother's womb."4 
He says we should not think of the sensus divinitatis as an innate faculty 
fully present from birth (as eyesight more or less is), but as a capacity for 
knowledge of God, "like the capacity for arithmetical knowledge .... The 
development of the sensus divinitatis requires a certain maturity (although 
it is often manifested by very young children)" (WCB, 173). In this respect 
of being susceptible to development the sensus divinitatis is like many other 
faculties. The auditory faculty is thus a capacity for discriminating sounds, 
say for distinguishing people's voices from one another. But some people 
develop this power of discrimination better than others. And it can be 
refined considerably (in some people, at least) by special disciplines like 
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the ear training that budding composers receive in conservatories of music. 
Similarly, practitioners of religion may have a fine-tunement of the sensus 
divinitatis that is a personal trait, something like the sensitivity that friends 
develop for one another, who are "alive" to one another's minds, who 
understand one another on the slightest cues. The virtue that Christians 
call faith is such a developed sensitivity.s As Brother Lawrence6 says, 
Christians "practice the presence of God," presumably becoming more 
sensitive to God's presence (both more accurately discriminating of it and 
more vividly impressed by it). Plantinga quotes Aquinas approvingly: 
But this [natural knowledge of God] admits of a mixture of many 
errors. Some people have believed that there is no other orderer of 
worldly things than the celestial bodies, and so they said that the 
celestial bodies are gods. Other people pushed it farther, to the very 
elements and the things generated from them, thinking that motion 
and the natural function which these elements have are not present in 
them as the effect of some other orderer, but that other things are 
ordered by them.' 
Plantinga notes wryly that if the outputs of the sensus divinitatis include 
such beliefs as these, then contemporary naturalists like Daniel Dennett 
and Richard Dawkins would count as having a natural knowledge of God 
(WeB, 177). It seems that this faculty can take several developmental 
directions, some of which yield beliefs that are inconsistent with theism. 
The conclusion seems pretty obvious: for the sensus to yield anything that 
could reasonably be called knowledge of God (that is, warranted true 
belief in God), an appropriate development of it is needed. As Aquinas would 
say, it needs to be "perfected." But "perfection of a natural faculty" is 
Aquinas's definition of a virtue.8 The virtue in this case would seem to be 
faith or something approaching it. A virtue is neither the faculty nor the 
proper functioning of the faculty, but the disposition of the faculty to func-
tion properly, or better, as we will argue in the next section, it is the dispo-
sition of the person to function properly with respect to one or more facul-
ties. It is what we have called the "basis" of the proper functioning. 
In a discussion of the possibility that theism is true but belief in God 
lacks warrant, Plantinga canvasses the parts of his definition of warrant to 
see which ones might be absent compatibly with the truth of theism. 
About the congenial environment condition, he says "there seems no rea-
son at all to think our epistemic environment is not the one for which 
[God] created us. (We have no reason, for example, to think that our 
ancestors originated on some other planet and made a long, hazardous 
journey to Earth)" (WCB, 189). But if we think of our cognitive equipment 
developmentally, as we are proposing to do, the environment becomes 
important in a somewhat different way, and the likelihood of its not being 
epistemically congenial seems greater. A few pages later, in a discussion of 
the noetic effects of sin (which include the dysfunction of the sensus divini-
tatis), Plantinga notes, "Because of our social nature, sin and its effects can 
be like a contagion that spreads from one to another, eventually corrupting 
an entire society or segment of it" (WCB, 207). If the sin in one's social 
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environment can degrade the functioning of the sensus divinitatis or impede 
its output, it would seem that some social environments could be more 
congenial than others as settings for the functioning of this faculty. For 
example, one might think that an undergraduate education at a Christian 
college is more likely to bring out the human potential for sensing God 
than an analogous education at a virulently and corrosively secular college. 
Admittedly, a Christian college is a different order of epistemic environ-
ment than a planet with a fine view of the starry heavens, since it is explic-
itly designed, not just to elicit episodes of functioning, but to cultivate dispo-
sitions to function in various ways. If it does cultivate the disposition for 
the sensus divinitatis to function as it was designed to do on Plantinga's con-
ception of that design plan, then in effect it cultivates an epistemic virtue 
on what ought to be Plantinga's conception of the formation of persons. 
So we see that at least in the case of the sensus divinitatis, the proper 
function of the faculty cannot be separated from the virtue that is the matu-
rity of the faculty or better, the personal disposition to use the faculty prop-
erly. But what kind of a disposition is a virtue? Let us continue using faith 
as our example. According to Plantinga, only in a person who has 
Christian faith does the sensus divinitatis function as well as it can for 
human beings (even then it probably doesn't function perfectly). 
However, Plantinga does not seem to think of faith as a virtue. He gives 
his account of Christian faith in the chapters on lithe extended Calvin / 
Aquinas model." 
The extended model shows how it is possible for Christians to be war-
ranted in believing such distinctively Christian claims as that God was in 
Christ reconciling the world to himself. The extended model has three 
chief elements: the Bible, the work of the Holy Spirit, and faith. Our cur-
rent interest in this part of the model is the positive epistemic role it assigns 
to emotions, and we are interested in emotions' epistemic role because of 
their close connection, in classic discussions, with traits of whole persons. 
On the extended A / C model the sensus divinitatis has been corrupted by 
sin and consequently will work properly only if healed by an event or 
process of salvation from sin. Such healing has been accomplished by a 
sequence of actions of God, in which Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son, lived a 
morally perfect life of service and was executed as a criminal by sinful 
humankind, thus suffering a death in which he atoned for the sins of the 
very sinners at whose hands he violently died. God raised Jesus from the 
dead and drew him back permanently into his presence. The story of this 
salvation is recorded and interpreted in the Bible, which is inspired by the 
Spirit of God, who also works in the hearts of people to convict them of the 
central truths that the Bible enshrines, such conviction being an important 
part of the process of salvation. 
Sin is not only a corruption of the sensus divinitatis (our intellectual 
equipment with respect to God), but also of our will (our faculty for loving, 
obeying, and enjoying God). So the faith that the Spirit produces in us 
through the words of Scripture about God's work in Christ is also a healing 
of our will. (Following Plantinga and the tradition, we will think of the 
will as having both an executive function, as the power to choose and initi-
ate action, and a conative / affective function, as expressed in inclinations 
8 Faith and Philosophy 
[desires and other concerns] and affections or emotions. We use 'affection' 
and 'emotion' interchangeably.) On the extended A / C model, intellect 
and will coordinate and interact in a variety of ways in producing correct 
affections and decisions with respect to God, as well as belief in God. The 
Holy Spirit's work in thus producing beliefs is not the functioning of a fac-
ulty, but it is (according to Christian doctrine) a properly functioning epis-
temic process that is successfully aimed at truth. Consequently, a Christian 
who believes the central Christian doctrines and does so as a result of this 
process is warranted in her beliefs, on Plantinga's conception of warrant. 
We want to argue, as we did about the previous part of Plantinga's A / 
C model, that it is a chrysaliS needing only a little development to emerge 
with all the colors and comely grace of a virtue account. The crucial issue 
is the nature of faith, and two questions are especially pertinent: 1) Is faith 
a virtue, that is, a disposition of the person, or is it more like a mental 
event, an episode that perhaps recurs regularly in the life of the believer, 
but is not a state or condition of the believer's character? and 2) What is the 
relation between the two aspects of faith, the beliefs and the emotions, and 
of the faculties underlying these, the intellect and the will? To put the 
question somewhat vaguely, are these aspects internally related, or related 
only in some external, say causal, way? Plantinga's discussion does not 
contain decisive answers to these questions, but its drift seems to be 
towards thinking of faith in episodic, rather than dispositional terms, and 
towards regarding intellect and will as rather independent, externally 
related faculties. This drift tends to impede the growth of Plantinga's 
proper function theory into a virtue epistemology. But the tradition from 
which he derives the extended A / C model seems to give different 
answers to these questions, and ones which, we will argue, are more plau-
sible. Let us begin with the second question. 
On Plantinga's A / C model, the sensus divinitatis is an intellectual facul-
ty, the function of which is not shared by the will. Although the operation 
of the intellect can in±1uence that of the will, and vice versa, and although 
Plantinga himself refuses to assign any strict priority to the one or the other 
in the production of religious knowledge, he makes the functions of these 
two faculties strictly non-overlapping. For example, he spends about 
twelve pages in chapter nine of WCB discussing the fundamental natural 
yearning of the human heart for God (this being surely a function of the 
will; we might call it the appetitio divinitatis), but does not make it part of 
the sensus divinitatis. When he speaks of the two faculties together, as they 
unite in faith, he uses purely conjunctive expressions, as in "We therefore 
need a change of attitude in addition to a change of opinion" (WCB, 270, 
italics added; see also 292, 293, 294, 295). 
Jonathan Edwards does not seem to separate will and intellect as 
Plantinga does. He seems closer to the view that in matters of Christian 
faith, at any rate, the will is a properly epistemic faculty. He writes that 
spiritual understanding 
consists in a sense of the heart, of the supreme beauty and sweetness 
of the holiness or moral perfection of divine things, together with all 
that discerning and knowledge of things of religion, that depends 
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upon, and flows from such a sense ... .I say, a sense of heart; for it is 
not speculation merely that is concerned in this kind of understand-
ing; nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two facul-
ties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately, in 
this matter. When the mind is sensible of the sweet beauty and ami-
ableness of a thing, that implies a sensibleness of sweetness and 
delight in the presence of the idea of it: and this sensibleness of the 
amiableness or delightfulness of beauty, carries in the very nature of 
it, the sense of the heart; or an effect and impression the soul is the 
subject of, as a substance possessed of taste, inclination and wil1.9 
9 
Edwards here distinguishes two kinds of knowledge and two kinds of fac-
ulties that produce them. "Speculation" produces knowledge of such 
things as the nature of a triangle, while knowledge of "the sweet beauty 
and amiableness of a thing" is produced by "a sense of the heart," some-
thing like a perceptual faculty that is a seat of inclination and is capable of 
being pleased or displeased. Thus two kinds of knowledge, one produced 
by the intellect, the other by the will. 
Let us illustrate what we think this means, using a non-religious exam-
ple. Imagine two equally intelligent people witnessing the following scene: 
Because of his race, a member of a racial minority is subtlely directed away 
from a white neighborhood in which he would like to buy a home, by the 
real estate agent who is helping him. The action is subtle enough to require 
intelligent discernment on the part of the two observers. They both under-
stand the real estate agent's action, but they have different emotional reac-
tions to it. One of them is highly displeased. She feels angry at the agent 
and sad for the home buyer, whom she sees as a representative of a long 
history of senseless suffering at the hands of prejudice. The other observer 
feels no displeasure; instead she is mildly amused by the agent's adroit 
maneuvers and even feels a little admiration of his skill in handling such 
"problems." In one sense both observers understand what is going on, but 
only one of them "tastes" the injustice in the situation. Even the morally 
indifferent observer may be able to subsume the current case under the cat-
egory injustice, thus showing her mastery of the concept of injustice, her 
moral understanding of the situation. But we want to say that by contrast 
with the emotional observer, she is still missing something epistemically: 
she does not appreciate the injustice, feel it or perceive it as the nasty thing it is. 
She has a "notional" understanding of the action as an injustice, but in a 
moral or spiritual sense there is something she's not "getting." Thus the 
emotion is a peculiar and indispensable mode of knowing something. The 
"will" is crossing over into the area of the "intellect," supplying a kind of 
"cognition" that the "intellect" by itself cannot produce. Or perhaps it is 
better to say, with Edwards, that "a clear distinction [cannot be] made 
between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly 
and separately, in this matter." (This is one epistemic function of emotions; 
several others will be discussed in the penultimate section of this paper.) 
Thus on our view, the affections are themselves sometimes a source of 
knowledge. But they are far more than that. They are at the very heart of 
the personal life; emotional dispositions are a large part of what we call 
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personality, and affect our actions and shape our relationships, not only 
with God but with our fellow human beings. lO Taken together, these two 
things - the epistemic importance of emotions and their general centrality 
to human life in all its aspects - suggest that an analysis of epistemic 
proper functioning needs to be understood in the larger context of charac-
ter. The neat division that has traditionally been drawn between the intel-
lectual and the affective, between the intellectual virtues and the moral 
ones, is artificial. We will argue this thesis further in later sections of this 
paper. 
But before proceeding to that, let us tum to the first of our two questions 
that will manifest the butterfly of virtue latent in Plantinga's proper func-
tion theory of knowledge. That question is about the nature of faith. Is 
faith a virtue - that is, a trait of the believer, an abiding dispositional qual-
ity of personality - or is it something more episodic, an event or process 
that goes on in the believer at conversion and is then repeated at other 
junctures of life? As a case of the joint proper functioning of the sensus 
divinitatis and the appetitio divinitatis, is faith a personality condition under-
lying the functioning, or is it simply the functioning itself? Consider first 
Jonathan Edwards, who regards faith as a "new nature." 
'Tis very true, that all grace and goodness in the hearts of the saints is 
entirely from God; and they are universally and immediately depen-
dent on him for it. But yet ... He gives his Spirit to be united to the 
faculties of the soul, and to dwell there after the manner of a principle 
of nature; so that the soul, in being endued with grace, is endued 
with a new nature: but nature is an abiding thing (342). 
Thus even if human contributions to the formation of faith such as reli-
gious education, choices of yielding one's members to God as instruments 
of righteousness, voluntarily undertaken spiritual disciplines, modeling of 
one Christian on another, efforts of self-surveillance and self-correction, 
etc., are somehow entirely the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit, still 
faith is, in Edwards's view, a virtue in the sense that it is an abiding dispo-
sition resulting from an inward change. It is not merely the sum of the 
Holy Spirit's distrete actions, in pulling strings and pushing levers in the 
converted. 
We have not been able to find a text in which Plantinga describes faith 
as a virtue, character trait, disposition, or new nature. He tends to charac-
terize it, instead, in two episodic ways, as a warranting belief forming 
process and as knowledge in the sense of the warranted judgments that are 
produced by this process. For example, 
... on this model, faith is a belief-producing process or activity, like 
perception or memory. It is a cognitive device, a means by which 
belief, and belief on a certain specific set of topics, is regularly pro-
duced in regular ways. In this it resembles memory, perception, rea-
son, sympathy, induction, and other more standard belief-producing 
processes. It differs from them in that it also involves the direct 
action of the Holy Spirit, so that the immediate cause of belief is not 
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to be found just in [the believer's] natural epistemic equipment 
(WCB, 256; Plantinga's italics}.!1 
It is also the warranted beliefs about the great things of the gospel that are 
produced by this process. 
The result of the work of the Holy Spirit is faith - which, according 
to both John Calvin and the model, is 'a firm and certain knowledge 
of God's benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth of the 
freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed 
upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit' (WCB, 290). 
But it seems to us utterly natural for someone who is concerned with 
Christian faith as a proper epistemic process and its outputs also to be con-
cerned with the dispositional base of that process, with the character of the 
person whose restored sensus divinitatis puts out true and warranted beliefs 
about God. This extension is particularly appropriate, given the preoccu-
pation of the New Testament and the Christian tradition with the transfor-
mation of whole persons in conversion and sanctification, as exemplified in 
the passage we quoted a moment ago from Edwards. As Edwards also 
stresses, that transformation is largely a transformation of the will, the seat 
of the affections (the will being at the very heart of the person), and 
Plantinga's concurrence with Edwards on that point thus puts him on the 
verge of emerging as a virtues theorist. 
As a virtue, faith is a poly consequential disposition, issuing in actions, 
emotions, and judgments. The more faith a person has, the more and / or 
better (by Christian standards) will be the actions, emotions, and judg-
ments in which that faith issues. The quality and quantity of each of these 
"issues" bear on warrant. Consider actions. Some Christians act on faith 
more regularly and with less environmental stimulus and support than 
others, making sacrifices for the sake of the gospel, performing acts of com-
passion in imitation of Christ and for his sake, bearing witness in hostile 
environments to the good news of the gospel. Christians differ from one 
another in the boldness and consistency with which they act out of faith. 
This difference bears on warrant because, as common experience in 
Christian circles attests, not only does bold action come from conviction, 
but conviction grows out of bold action. And as Plantinga affirms, confi-
dence of belief bears on warrant. 
Consider emotions. On the account of emotions we commend, they are 
a kind of immediate impression or "perception" of situations in terms of 
their propositional content, including the evaluations involved.12 The joy 
that is characteristic of faith is an impression of the goodness of what God 
has done for us in Christ; faith's gratitude is an impression of God's 
unmerited benevolence towards us; faith's hope is a perception of the won-
derfulness of our eternal future. On this quasi-Edwardsian account, then, 
the religious affections are to the value of the great things of the gospel 
something like what being appeared to redly is to the belief that something 
red is before one: they are a kind of non-inferential ground of beliefs (judg-
ments). As the proper functioning of the will / intellect in this basic belief-
forming way, they bear on warrant. 
12 Faith and Philosophy 
Consider judgments. The person of faith will daily make many judg-
ments corollary to the great things of the gospel: My [dead] mother is enjoy-
ing the presence of God. This person who has just cheated me out of $50 is some-
one for whom Christ died. The twinge of envy I just felt is evidence of the corrup-
tion of my heart. Etc. As a disposition that can be more or less deeply or 
fully formed or mature in a person, it is a disposition with respect to which 
Christians differ from one another. Not only will the person of greater 
faith make more judgments corollary to the great things of the gospel, he 
will make them more spontaneously and with greater conviction and con-
fidence. This variance of confidence will affect warrant, on Plantinga's 
view, for he thinks that, if other elements of warrant are in place, of two 
persons believing the same proposition the one who believes it with 
greater conviction or confidence has greater warrant. 
Epistemic Functioning and the Concept of a Virtue 
We are arguing that Plantinga's proper function theory of knowledge 
needs to be completed in a virtue account that bases epistemic proper func-
tioning not just in healthy epistemic faculties narrowly conceived, but in 
certain virtues that are both qualifications of the person's emotional life 
and patterns of use of the epistemic faculties involved. We are not claim-
ing that to have sufficient warrant to be knowledge all beliefs must be gen-
erated from such virtues; our claim, rather, is that some very important 
kinds of beliefs cannot, in practice, be generated without the virtues. We 
have illustrated our point using Plantinga's application of his theory to 
religious belief. We think it is significant that here, where by Plantinga's 
lights the most important kind of human knowledge is concerned, the 
emotions come to playa crucial positive role in the generation of knowl-
edge. Nowhere else in Plantinga's account of knowledge is this positive 
role so clear. But the positive role of the emotions and the need for the per-
sonal epistemic virtues is not limited to the generating of religious beliefs. 
In the remainder of this paper we want to show that pretty much all kinds 
of deep, difficult, and important knowledge require proper (that is, virtu-
ous) personal (that is, emotional) epistemic functioning. Virtues, as we will 
understand them here, are cultivated excellent dispositions and powers by 
which people function excellently as persons. (They are to be contrasted 
with cultivated excellent powers for field-specific functions, for example in 
molecular biology or ice hockey.) The epistemic virtues are a subset of the 
human virtues, being generically human cultivated excellent dispositions 
and powers to acquire, maintain, transmit, or apply knowledge. '3 Such 
virhles are generically human (not field-specific) because such involve-
ments with knowledge are generically human. We gave a list of such traits 
in the opening paragraph of this paper. What is the relation between 
virtues such as these and the epistemic faculties? 
We have faculties that enable us to form correct beliefs when they are 
functioning properly, but that is just the beginning of the story about prop-
er epistemic functioning. Coming to know, as well as maintaining, trans-
mitting, and applying our knowledge often depends on the skillful deploy-
ment of these faculties, on culture-bound cultivation of the faculty or of 
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parts of the mind that function in deployments of the faculty, and depends 
in the typical case on the personal aims, desires and attachments, emotions 
and actions of the knower. As knowers or would-be knowers, we are not 
just a coordination of faculties, analogous to an automobile which is noth-
ing but a coordination of functional parts. People are epistemic agents -
beings equipped with faculties for knowing things, who pursue knowledge 
by various means which centrally involve those faculties. To the extent 
that epistemic faculties are equipment, they may sometimes function mag-
nificently and yet not generate knowledge of the kind they were designed 
to yield, just as a car might function perfectly with respect to engine, 
brakes, and other parts, and yet not be functioning very well as transporta-
tion if driven by a driver who didn't care where he was going or periodi-
cally depressed the brake pedal just to enjoy the sensation of being precipi-
tated forward in the seat.14 
Let us illustrate how personal virtues can ground proper intellectual 
functioning. A fact of our intellectual lives is that new information and 
new arguments frequently challenge us to revise our beliefs. Sometimes 
the possible revision is far-reaching. When it is, we may have to decide 
whether to abandon a hypotheSiS, belief, or avenue of research, or to perse-
vere with it despite considerable uncertainty about its viability or outcome. 
Two coordinated virtues are relevant to this situation. On one hand, over 
the long haul we will have better warranted beliefs if we are open to revi-
sion, flexible and willing to revise. Such intellectual openness will have an 
emotional dimension. For example, the open person will either not feel too 
much anxiety about revising significant beliefs or will be able to master the 
anxiety he has, so as to make appropriate revisions. He will be eager to 
improve his beliefs, and so will greet criticisms with hope, readily15 feel dis-
comfort with beliefs that begin to seem wrong to him, and take satisfaction 
in revisions. On the other hand, over the long haul our beliefs will have 
more warrant if we do not too easily give up our beliefs, hypotheses, and 
research programs, but persevere in them long enough to understand, 
develop, and test them well. Such intellectual tenacity or perseverance will 
also have an emotional dimension: the tenacious person will have reason-
able, well tempered confidence in herself as an epistemic agent, a confi-
dence that will get her through the hard times and reinforce the hopeful-
ness with which she addresses the tasks of the easier days. She will be rel-
atively little beset with the emotion of impatience, and will be able to find 
satisfaction or joy in the small increments of progress that she may achieve 
from day to day and week to week, while at the same time keeping 
focused with hopefulness on the longer-term goals of her research. Behind 
both openness and tenacity is what might be counted as yet a third virtue: 
an enthusiasm and taste for knowing. Coordinated with these three 
virtues in the epistemically well functioning person is a power of judg-
ment, fairly specific to the particular knowledge in question, as to when to 
persevere and when to abandon a hypothesis or line of inquiry. Because of 
its specificity to a field or research question, such judgment may be best 
thought of as a skill rather than a virtue. 
The analogy of car and driver has limited application, since what are 
called epistemic faculties are not all well thought of as equipment. They 
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depart from this category in at least two ways. In our discussion of 
Plantinga's interpretation of Edwards, we counted the will as a faculty and 
said it can function well or badly. But it seems odd to designate the will as 
a piece of equipment on a par with eyesight or hearing or the ability to cal-
culate. A deaf or blind person can be an excellent person, but to have a 
perverted or non-functioning will - chronically inappropriate desires, 
emotions, and attachments, and a disposition to make bad choices, or the 
complete lack of any of these powers - seems to be almost a definition of 
the deepest human dysfunction. The will seems to be the center of the per-
son or personality, and this is shown by the fact that it is odd to speak of 
using the will well or badly. It is true that a person can dissociate from 
some deliverances of his will, such as some desires and emotions (thus crit-
icizing and / or controlling them), but there is always some perspective of 
the will that is not dissociated from and can thus not be regarded as "used" 
even in this attenuated sense. By contrast, it makes perfectly good sense to 
speak of using inferential powers or hearing or memory. So in the automo-
bile analogy, the center of the will, at any rate, is not the car, but the driver. 
But most epistemologists who speak of epistemic faculties do not include 
the will among them, and as we have seen, even Planting a is reluctant to 
make the will a straightforwardly epistemic faculty. 
So not all faculties are equipment. But even faculties that are straightfor-
wardly equipment-like, such as vision and the power of a priori reasoning, 
seem to be subject to development and deep integration into other aspects 
of life, and in this way are unlike ordinary equipment. As we get better at 
driving, the steering wheel and the engine do not improve, but only the dri-
ver. By contrast, we do not just get better at using our hearing and vision, 
but the faculties themselves seem to become more discriminating, say with 
musical ear-training and training in the visual recognition of plant species. 
What is it for vision to function properly? There seem to be broadly two 
kinds of answer to this question. In one sense our visual apparatus func-
tions well when the lenses focus sharply on the retinas and the retinas and 
other parts of the neurological equipment function in the way that an oph-
thalmolOgist would consider "normal." Proper functioning is 20-20 vision. 
This is the sense in which vision is most like a steering wheel. It does not 
get better with training, at least not much better. But vision can be trained 
in many ways, and the standards of proper functioning here will be laid 
down by the field in which the eyes are used: arnbulation and throwing in 
basketball, various fields of microscopy, discriminating copies from origi-
nals of old paintings. In this deeper kind of seeing, vision in the equipment 
sense is integrated with motor skills, complex conceptual schemata, art his-
tory. An important social kind of vision is the visual recognition of others' 
emotions through facial expressions. By seeing others' emotions on their 
faces, we are enabled to respond sensitively and appropriately to their emo-
tions and thus to pursue proper interpersonal relationships with others-
relations of mutuality, friendship, harmony, etc., as well as relationships of 
suspicion and critical judgment. Since the subject's own moral-emotional 
mahlrity seems to be behind her ability to see in this way, this is a place 
where vision becomes much more than a faculty in the sense of equipment, 
and becomes an epistemic function of the whole person. 
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Knowledge comes in many different kinds and degrees of complexity, 
some depending on intellectual virtues and others not. A very young child 
may have all the proper epistemic functioning that is needed to know that 
Mommy has come home, by forming the belief that Mommy has come 
home on the basis of the auditory experiences of hearing the door shut and 
his mother's voice calling out "I'm home," and forming it in the kind of 
environment to which these powers are fitted. For such functioning, noth-
ing in the way of epistemic virtue (in our preferred sense) is needed; it is 
quite enough if the child's faculties are functioning properly in more or less 
the equipment sense. The laboratory pathologist provides an intermediate 
case, for she will need a harder-won sort of proper epistemic functioning to 
recognize, under the microscope, a certain cell formation as basal cell skin 
cancer. But we are more likely to call her power of perception a skill than a 
virtue, because it is so specialized and narrowly focused: her ability to dif-
ferentiate pathological cell formations visually is an excellence, all right, 
but one that makes her not so much a better person as a better professional. 
(We do think that people develop such high skills only if they have intel-
lectual virtues in some degree - say, studiousness and perseverance.) But 
in addition to properly functioning faculties and intellectual skills are a 
group of powers not usually stressed by epistemologists - the epistemic 
virtues proper. Consider, for example, the power by which one is enabled 
and disposed to recognize subtle influences of envy and greed in one's 
own thoughts and actions that are to all outward appearances generous; or 
that combination of tenacity and openness in intellectual pursuits that we 
mentioned earlier. These are kinds of epistemic formation that do make 
their subject excellent as a person, and they are such not only because they 
have a generality that makes them applicable across a wide range of situa-
tions and topics, but also because they draw on concerns and powers that 
are basic to the constitution of good character. 
Emotions and the Acquisition of Knowledge 
In commenting on our illustrations we have stressed ways in which the 
intellectually virtuous person's emotions are qualified because we are 
interested in virtues that are attributable to the person and not merely to 
his parts, and we take human emotions to arise, typically, out of concerns 
that may be deeply determinative of one's character or personality.lb Let 
us canvass some of the main ways that emotion-dispositions enter into the 
virtues that make us excellent epistemic agents. 
First, a "passion" for knowledge (interest in it) seems likely to promote 
the acquisition of it, and to promote high quality knowledge. A striking 
example of intellectual enthusiasm is Barbara McClintock, the Nobel Prize-
winning geneticist. Driven by her interest in com chromosomes she spent 
about sixty years doing meticulous studies that yielded several innovative 
findings fundamental to 20th century genetics, despite gender discrimina-
tion which prevented her having a significant university post, as well as 
the incomprehension of other scientists due to the complexity of her 
research and the unconventionality of her ideas. Her story makes clear 
that she was less interested in the fame, power, and fortune that sometimes 
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accrues to successful scientists than she was in com chromosomes and how 
they work. After a scientific meeting at which her summary of her discov-
eries "fell like a lead balloon" on the ears of fellow scientists, she comment-
ed, "I was startled when I found they didn't understand it, didn't take it 
seriously. But it didn't bother me. I just knew I was right. People get the 
idea that your ego gets in the way a lot of time - ego in the sense of want-
ing returns. But you don't care about those returns. You have the enor-
mous pleasure of working on it." And on receiving her Nobel Prize she 
commented, lilt's such a pleasure to carry out an experiment when you 
think of something - carry it out and watch it go - it's a great, great plea-
sure. It couldn't be nicer. . . .1 just have been so interested in what I was 
doing, and it's been such a pleasure, such a deep pleasure, that I never 
thought of stopping."17 Given the enormous difficulty of acquiring for the 
first time the kind of knowledge that McClintock discovered, it seems clear 
that a passion (that is, emotion disposition) like hers, which generates not 
only the joy she speaks of, but also on occasion frustration, hope, 
disappointment, anxiety, anger, and other emotions, is an important 
ground of its acquisition. Here the emotions manifest or instantiate the 
concern for knowledge; this concern is a source of warrant analogous to 
the proper functioning of the cognitive equipment. It is an intellectual 
proper functioning of the will (lithe will to know") and as such is partially 
constitutive of intellectual virtues such as tenacity, openness, hUmility, and 
honesty. Emotions with the requisite objects may thus be manifestations of 
intellectual virtues. 
Second, Planting a has noted that degree of warrant can vary with 
degree of felt inclination to believe.ls For example, one is typically more 
wammted in believing that 2+2=4 than in believing the solution to a com-
plex differential equation because one is more strongly inclined to the for-
mer than to the latter belief. In our discussion of Plantinga's religious epis-
temology we suggested that a person's emotional disposition may affect 
such inclination; the same is true in scientific epistemology. Consider 
Barbara McClintock again, proposing her genetic hypothesis to a disbeliev-
ing scientific community, yet retaining the strong conviction that she is 
right. Then imagine another scientist who has gathered the same evidence 
and arrived at the same conclusion, but who, because of vanity and lack of 
intellectual autonomy, is put off by his colleagues' disbelief, and wavers in 
his conviction that he is right. If Plantinga's point is correct, McClintock is 
more warranted in her belief than her colleague is in his, even if they have 
the same belief and the same evidence for it. It seems dear that the differ-
ence between the two scientists is one of character, and in particular, of 
their emotional dispositions. McClintock's intellectual autonomy is afford-
ed by her passionate interest in the plants and the questions about how 
they work, nearly to the exclusion of concern (and the correlative emo-
tions) about professional reputation; but the other scientist, in anxiety to be 
well regarded by his colleagues, loses sight of the truths he has garnered. 
Third, emotions can assist knowledge by influencing what counts as 
evidence for a given knower and how much weight he assigns iU9 A biog-
rapher, for example, will tend to notice and stress the traits of his subject 
that he admires or despises. Thus an investigator may be better or worse 
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suited by his own character to be the biographer of a given life. John Wain, 
in his biography of Samuel Johnson, takes James Boswell to task for failing 
to give a just impression, in his biography, of the side of Johnson's person-
ality that is represented by his opposition to colonialism, "his hatred of the 
slave trade, his pleas for a more merciful penal system; his insistence that 
the real test of any civilization lies in its treatment of the poor." And he 
explains Boswell's intellectual failure by reference to his character: 
Boswell was a sentimental-romantic Tory of a very different stripe . 
... being the son of a laird and a bit of a snob, he deferred to titled 
people, where Johnson, for all his support of "subordination," was 
just as likely to growl at them; ... being untroubled by any notion of 
the basic rights of the human being, he thought the slave trade an 
excellent institution. 20 
Boswell's problem was not that he lacked evidence for the humane side of 
Johnson, but that, lacking emotional responsiveness to that evidence 
(admiration for this aspect of Johnson's personality), he did not give it due 
weight. 
Dialectical exchange is another context where emotional receptivity to 
information may affect reasoning. When you argue with someone to 
whom you feel uncharitable, you may be inclined to put the worst con-
struction on her arguments. If your interlocutor has genuine information 
or inferential insights to offer, your emotions may impede your acquisition 
of knowledge. But if you feel respect and charity for your interlocutor, you 
will be inclined to listen carefully to her statements and search for a plausi-
ble interpretation of them, thus increasing your likelihood of getting access 
to certain meanings and information. We admit that people are sometimes 
led to precise interpretations of their dialectical opponents by less virtuous 
emotions such as fear of looking stupid, or even malicious hope of making 
the interlocutor look stupid; we also admit that an epistemically misguided 
charity can make a person insufficiently critical of his interlocutor's argu-
ments. In the last case what seems needed is other intellectual virtues, like 
passion for truth, to be coordinated with charity. However, in the long run 
and other things being equal (like the other intellectual virtues, and such 
faculties as intelligence and skills like dialectical skill), we think the moral 
virtue of charity, applied to dialectical exchange, is likely to be a net pro-
moter of epistemic warrant. At least, this will be so in congenial social-
intellectual environments. 
As we argued in our discussion of Edwards, emotions are important in 
producing knowledge of values. Our next three points elaborate this claim. 
Thus fourth, a case can be made that emotions themselves are perceptual or 
quasi-perceptual states (not necessarily sense-perceptual states),21 a kind of 
"seeing" -as; in emotions one sees situations in light of their import to one-
self or ilberhaupt.22 For example, if McOintock is disgusted at administrators 
of the University of Missouri for standing in the way of her research while 
promoting that of inferior male scientists, she perceives the situation as 
"stinking" and corrupt and not worth further investment and effort from 
her. If the disgust is well formed, it affords her a warranted view of the 
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actual values of this situation, a view that would be less full and precise 
(though perhaps not altogether absent) if she beheld the situation without 
emotion.23 But if emotions are a major source of our knowledge of the val-
ues of things, they can also be false perceptions (as sense perceptions are 
sometimes false). Just as people grow and mature in their capacity to per-
ceive accurately with their five senses, they may mature in their ability to 
perceive accurately with their emotions. Aristotle defines moral virtues as 
dispositions to feel passions at the right time, in the right way, towards the 
right person, etc.24 Thus on a plausible account of at least some moral 
virtues, these have an intellectual or knowledge-gathering dimension: they 
are dispositions to perceive the moral qualities of situations. 
Fifth, awareness or feeling of emotion can be an important access to self-
know ledge. Not all emotions are felt, but when they are, they afford the 
subject an opportunity to read his own character. If emotions are manifes-
tations of concerns and attachments, and concerns and attachments are 
what virtues and vices are largely made of, then emotions are often mani-
festations of virtues and vices. For example, one who feels envy of a 
friend's academic success and has a modicum of wisdom about moral 
symptomatology may be able to see in that emotion a perverse competi-
tiveness with a person whose joy should be an occasion for her to rejoice 
toO.25 The cognitive virtue of self-insight seems to have two "emotional" 
components: a transparency to one's own emotions (a tendency to feel 
them), and an ability to "read" them. The ability to read them is itself an 
emotional ability. Consider a person who feels envy and knows that this is 
a symptom of an inappropriately competitive character, but feels nothing 
about feeling envy (feels no discomfort, no shame, no anxiety or dismay). 
Such a person does not have the fullest form of self-insight because, while 
she "knows" what she is, she does not fully appreciate it. If one's emotions 
can be an access to knowledge of one's own character, observations of 
other people's emotions can be an access to knowledge of their character, 
an access sometimes less ambiguous than the observation of their actions. 
This epistemic virtue - we might call it character-insight - like self-
inSight, depends on the ability to experience and appreciate emotions. This 
fact is highlighted by cases of persons who conspicuously lack the ability, 
like Temple Grandin, a highly intelligent autistic woman discussed by 
Oliver Sacks.26 
Sixth, another person's emotions may reflect more accurately the values 
of a situation than one's own do, because of his or her greater virtue (jus-
tice, compassion, honesty); that is, the other's emotions may be more war-
ranted than one's own in virtue of the person's being a better functioning 
person. But more virtuous persons sometimes influence the emotions of 
less mature persons who associate with them. For example, in the pres-
ence of someone with a strong sense of social justice, someone less devel-
oped may, by a sort of sympathy, come to feel an indignation at injustices 
and hope of their rectification that she is not disposed to feel on her own. 
Through this sympathetic emotion the less developed person achieves, for 
the moment, a moral perception similar to that of the more developed per-
son. In such a case the wiser person may, by his expressed emotion, trans-
mit moral knowledge to someone else. Children learn how to feel, in part, 
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by imitating sympathetically the emotions of their parents. Even in the less 
developed person, the ability to experience situations via sympathy with 
the emotions of others depends on a kind of sensitivity that can be thought 
of as an (incipient) epistemic virtue. Some people lack even this amount of 
sensitivity. 
Our first six connections between emotions and knowledge are ones in 
which emotions foster knowledge or are strongly associated with some-
thing (e.g. the concern for knowledge) that fosters it. By contrast, the litera-
ture on epistemology, when it has spoken of emotions at all, has spoken 
chiefly of their role as impeders of knowledge. For example, 
... proper function can be impeded by pride, ambition, lust, anger, 
patriotism, fear, greed, impatience, buck fever, mother love, avarice, 
hate, undue sensitivity, excessive pessimism (or optimism) and the 
like; and when this happens warrant is often excluded. . . .loyalty and 
love for your friend prevents you from seeing what you otherwise 
might have, namely that she has been lying to you.... . .. Now I pro-
pose to describe these phenomena in terms of 'impeding proper func-
tion' .... 27 
In connection with emotions' power to impede knowledge, two virtues 
reminiscent of classical ones stand out as corrective. Let us say that tem-
perance is a disposition to have proper, and only proper, emotions and 
appetites.2S The more temperate a person is, the less her knowledge-gath-
ering and -maintaining will be impeded by improper emotions. But some 
of the emotions that impede knowledge are not improper in themselves, 
and so even the temperate person may have episodes of passion that 
undermine knowledge, and thus be in need of the virtue of self-control, 
which is the ability to evaluate and set aside, disregard, transcend, sup-
press, or otherwise manage emotions, desires, and impulses that, at a given 
moment of life, are contrary to one's purposes, whether these passions are 
strictly speaking improper or just inopportune. Because emotions do often 
undermine the processes of knowledge-acquisition and -maintenance, war-
rant will often depend on a person's having these virtues. If impatience 
often induces people to form beliefs without the labor and care that alone 
would give them warrant, then patience, in one or more of two possible 
forms, will be an important virtue for aspiring knowers. In its temperance 
form, patience will be the disposition not to have improper impulses of 
impatience, but to be satisfied to move along in one's research at an appro-
priate pace, taking each moment and each day as it comes. In its self-con-
trol form, patience will consist in an alertness to the detriments that impa-
tience threatens, an ability to recognize impulses of impatience as such and 
to cut through any rationalizations that might dim one's awareness of 
those impulses, and both a motivation and an ability to manage those 
impulses so they do not undermine the acquisition of knowledge. 
In several ways, then, emotions determine human epistemic functioning 
for good and for ill, and so must be taken account of in any construction of 
proper epistemic functioning. Emotion dispositions and emotion-directed 
dispositions that promote knowledge are aspects of the base for proper 
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functioning of human epistemic agents. As such, they are traits of the per-
sons whose beliefs are most likely to have warrant. 
An Illustration 
Consider Plantinga's discussion of a passage from John Locke, who imag-
ines a seasoned professor confronted all of a sudden with a bright graduate 
student who makes a point that undermines a fundamental principle of the 
professor's life's work. 
Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned professor, and that 
which his scarlet would blush at, to have his authority of forty years 
standing wrought out of hard rock Greek and Latin, with no small 
expence of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition, and 
a reverend beard, in an instant overturned by an upstart novelisf9? 
Can anyone expect that he should be made to confess, that what he 
taught his scholars thirty years ago, was all errour and mistake; and 
that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate? 
Plantinga distinguishes two kinds of faculties whose functioning may 
affect the warrant of the professor's beliefs. "The professor's faculties may 
be functioning properly (there may be a properly functioning defense 
mechanism at work); but his belief that the young upstart is dead wrong 
would have little by way of warrant."30 So Locke's description does not 
suggest that the professor is suffering from bad hearing or a neurological 
dysfunction that prevents his understanding the novelist's point. 
However, Plantinga notes that a defense mechanism, say, against psycho-
logical devastation by shame, may also be functioning properly, to its own 
purpose, undermining the work for which the properly epistemic faculties 
are designed. 
So the professor himself is not functioning well epistemically, despite his 
unimpaired faculties. Contrast the case of another professor. After arguing 
that the search in recent epistemology for the single correct concept of epis-
temic justification has been a mistake, William Alston comments: 
It will, I hope, have become clear by now that the thesis of this paper 
is .ill iconoclastic and revolutionary one, a bold departure from the 
well trodden pathways of the discipline. It implies that a large pro-
portion of contemporary epistemologists, including myself, have 
been misguided in their researches, fighting under a false banner, 
engaged in a quixotic tilting at windmills.31 
It is bue that Alston goes on to confess the pleasures of iconoclasm and to 
show how a good portion of the epistemological windmill-tilting over 
recent decades can be redeemed, after all, by reconceiving somewhat the 
goals of epistemology. But still, it is an impressive epistemic attribute to 
be able to see and admit that what one has been laboring at for the past 
several decades and enshrining in ink, and what one has been lionized for, 
is pretty fundamentally misconceived. The difference between Locke's 
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professor and Alston is, as Plantinga's language suggests, not a difference 
of the excellence of epistemic faculties. But it is a difference of epistemic 
functioning, and one that would seem to be an asset for a philosopher. 
Locke's professor is blinded to truth by the deterrent of shame, by the stake 
of his honor and status and image and identity as professor that, as he sees 
it, will be compromised by so fundamental an admission of error. Alston, 
by contrast, is willing to suffer the embarrassment because of his overrid-
ing interest in getting epistemology right. Or perhaps he sees more clearly 
that there is not much shame in disowning a significant part of his work in 
the interest of truth. 
So we need to assess not just faculties, but their integration into the char-
acter of the epistemic agent. Perhaps it is psychologically needful that peo-
ple have a defense against devastating shame, but adjustments are possible 
here, and normatively called for. One might think that the professor is 
overly ashamed, or ashamed of what is not really or deeply shameful; or 
that it would be better for his defenses to be more permeable than they are. 
By contrast with Alston, Locke's professor is one in whom the defense 
mechanism may be functioning properly if construed in isolation from the 
larger context of the purposes of his life, but is functioning in such a way as 
to make him something of an intellectual coward. His defense mechanism 
is functioning properly in the way that the eyesight of a person with 20-20 
vision is functioning properly, despite the fact that her visual assessments 
of people's emotional states are skewed. 
On a plausible description of the professor's mind, taking cues from 
Locke's references to his authority and his reverend beard, the professor's 
failure to hear the student's point is due to the emotional structure of his 
personality (his self-image as important and learned and his emotional 
attachment to that self-image; the subordination of the concern for truth to 
the concern to be respected). By contrast, on a plausible description of 
Alston's mind, it is not just that he did his epistemic duty so as to form the 
belief that the jig was up for monolithic theories of justification. Instead, 
the order of his concerns was somewhat different from that of the profes-
sor; his character was differently formed. Getting it right philosophically 
was a powerful enough concern to override the concern to maintain the 
full lustre of his previous accomplishments. If the difference between these 
professors is in the excellence of their faculties, it is largely a difference in 
the functioning of their wills. But it is also a difference in their ftmctioning 
as epistemic agents. And this difference bears quite directly on the warrant 
of their beliefs. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that proper function epistemology requires completion as 
a virtues epistemology of a particular sort that we have called personal 
virtues epistemology. Personal virtues are excellences of the whole person 
rather than of the narrowly epistemic faculties. In particular we have 
argued that for the knower to function properly as a knower, his will, espe-
cially as a source of emotions or affections, needs to be shaped and com-
pleted to form such epistemic virtues as charity, fairness, intellectual hon-
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esty, love of knowledge (truth), perseverance, openness, caution, boldness, 
and humility. Such virtues tend to increase the epistemic desideratum of 
warrant, among other desiderata, not for all kinds of knowledge but very 
much for the more difficult and important kinds. 
At a conference on virtue epistemology, and partly in response to our 
exploration of epistemic humility at that conference,32 Plantinga comment-
ed on the virtues and limitations of virtue epistemology. Among the 
virtues he mentioned the following. Focusing on the virtues alerts us to 
the diversity of kinds of knowledge, and calls our attention to kinds that 
epistemologists have neglected in recent decades. Among these are moral 
knowledge of self and other, and scientific knowledge (we would add reli-
gious knowledge). Second, virtue epistemology tends to bring out the 
variety of epistemic goods. Knowledge is not the only one. 
Understanding and clarity of expression are others. Third, virtue episte-
mology encourages us to note epistemically relevant states of the knowing 
agent that we might otherwise miss. For example, there has been very lit-
tle discussion of epistemic humility in the recent literature, and only a little 
more of the relevance of emotions to knowing. 
However, Plantinga pointed out that virtue epistemology is not well 
suited to promote a project that has dominated epistemology since Gettier 
and before: that of defining knowledge. Any definition that places virtues 
among the necessary conditions of knowledge will be far too strong. It will 
rule out simple cases of perceptual knowledge and slightly more complex 
ones like our example of the child who knows his mother has come home 
when she calls out upon arrival. Nor is any amount of virtue, generating 
true belief, sufficient for knowledge. For example, imagine that Hank has a 
brain tumor that is emitting, in some eccentric way, data from which Hank 
concludes, by honest and persevering research and charitable interpreta-
tions of his interlocutors and heroic openness to new ideas, that he has a 
brain tumor. Even though Hank believes truly that he has a brain tumor, 
and came to this belief by way of calling upon impressive intellectual 
virtues, he does not know that he has a brain tumor. 
We agree. Personal virtue epistemology is not well suited to the project of 
defining knowledge. We do not know whether proper functionalism or any 
other theory can define knowledge. The history of efforts to define knowl-
edge in the twentieth century is strewn with corpses of theories exploded by 
ingenious counterexamples. But we understand many concepts for which 
we do not have strict definitions, and the goal of personal virtue epistemolo-
gy is to promote our understanding of epistemic agents, especially when 
they are engaged in the pursuit of the more difficult and important kinds of 
knowledge. The strict definition of knowledge is not our aim. 
Baylor University and Wheaton College 
NOTES 
1. See Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
46-47. See also "Why We Need Proper Function," Nous 27 (1993): 66-82, 73. 
PROPER FUNCTION, EMOTION, VIRTUES OF INTELLECT 23 
2. Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Hereafter WCB. 
3. We do not deny the propriety of other uses of 'virtue.' As Ernest Sosa 
points out, the Greeks used 'arete' for excellences even of such things as knives 
(Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge University 
Press 1991, 271), and we have no reason to legislate that an excellence such as 
20-20 vision, even taken in abstraction from larger and deeper personal powers 
of vision, is not a virtue. Application of 'virtue' to excellences of knives and 
eyes is even good English, though we think it is not the central sense of the 
word in modem English. Also, as will be seen later in the paper, to say that 
virtues in our sense are dispositions with respect to emotions is not to deny 
that they are dispositions with respect to other things, such as actions and 
judgments. On our view, emotions, actions, and judgments are capable of a 
complex set of internal relations. For example, a person often judges the con-
tent of his emotion to be true and is thereby moved to perform an action whose 
reason is also the content of his emotion and his judgment. 
4. Institutes of the Christian Religion, Tr. Ford Lewis Battles and ed. John T. 
McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), volume I, 46. 
5. In Christian conversion and sanctification, "the sensus divinitatis is part-
ly healed and restored to proper function by faith and the concomitant work of 
the Holy Spirit in one's heart" (WCB, 186; Plantinga's italics). 
6. The Practice of the Presence of God (New Kensington, P A: Whitaker 
House, 1982). 
7. Summa Contra Gentiles III, 38, 3, translated by Vernon Bourke (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1975). 
8. See Summa Tlzeologice lA2lE 56, 6, reply. 
9. Religious Affections, edited by John Smith (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1959), 272. 
10. For a rather rich account of the latter, see Edwards's Charity and its 
Fruits: Christian Love as Manifested in the Heart and Life (Edinburgh: Banner of 
Truth Trust, 1969; originally published 1852). 
11. He also makes the by now familiar point that faith is an affection pro-
ducing process. See p.270. 
12. See Robert C. Roberts, "What An Emotion Is: A Sketch" Philosophical 
Review 97 (1988): 183-209; and Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology 
(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), Chapter Two. 
13. In this paper we concentrate, as most epistemologists do, on acquisi-
tion. However, a more complete account of the epistemic virtues would illu-
minate their relation to other epistemic goals. See W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: 
Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 
Chapter Two. 
14. To our knowledge it was Lorraine Code who in recent epistemology 
first distinguished faculty excellence from agent excellence, commenting that 
attributions of cognitive virtues II are more appropriately assigned to persons 
than to faculties." See her Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover and London: 
University Press of New England, 1987), 57. Linda Zagzebski makes the same 
distinction in her criticism of Plantinga. See her Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996),319-329. The distinction needs some qualifications that 
we will discuss in a moment. 
15. The less open person may be capable of feeling this discomfort, but tend 
to repress or ignore such emotions, and will accordingly feel them less readily. 
The dogmatist or ideologist who is very closed to revision of his beliefs may 
simply do his best not to get in a position to see what may be wrong with them, 
and so protect himself more radically against such discomforts. 
24 Faith and Philosophy 
16. In both the Aristotelian and the sentimentalist traditions, virtues are 
strongly associated with emotions and emotion dispositions. See, for example, 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1l04b4-15, 1l05b25-29, 1l06b15-22; Aquinas's 
Summa TheologiiP, 1a2ce Questions 22-48, 59; David Hume's Treatise, Book n 
and Book III, especially Parts I and III; Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, especially Parts I-III. However, in both these traditions it is not the 
intellectual, but the moral virtues that are so associated. Our policy of not 
marking a strict division between moral and intellectual virtues is a departure 
from both of these traditions. 
17. Quotations are from Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, Nobel Prize Women in 
Science (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993), 168, 173. 
18.. "When my faculties are functioning properly, a belief has warrant to 
the degree that I find myself inclined to accept it; and this (again, if my facul-
ties are functioning properly and nothing interferes) will be the degree to 
which I do accept it" (Warrant and Proper Function, 9). 
19 .. This connection is a major theme of William Wainwright's Reason and 
the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995). 
20. Samuel Johnson (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 14. 
21. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
22. This is a corollary of Roberts's account of emotions. See note 12. 
23. For discussion, see William Tolhurst, "On the Epistemic Value of Moral 
Experience" Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 Supplement 1990, 67-87. 
24. Nicomachean Ethics, 1l06b15-22. 
25. For discussion, see Robert C. Roberts, "Feeling One's Emotions and 
Knowing Oneself" Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 319-338. 
26. See An Anthropologist on Mars (Toronto: Vintage Books), 244-296. 
27. Alvin Plantinga, "Precis of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and 
Proper Function" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1993), 444-45. 
28. We extend the concept of temperance here beyond the classic one, 
whidl limits it to bodily appetites. On the present concept many of the moral 
virtues are, on Aristotle's account, versions of temperance. 
29. Novelist: "t2. One who is inexperienced; a novice. 1630 Lennard tr. 
Charron's Wisd. ILVn §18. 305 There is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt 
and hinder vs, if wee bee but nouelists therein" (Oxford English Dictionary). 
30. Warrant and Proper Function, 12. Compare WCB 149-151. 
31. "Epistemic Desiderata" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 
(1993): 527-551; 541-2. 
32. See "Humility and Epistemic Goods" in Michael DePaul and Linda 
Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
